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REASONABLE DOUBT REDUX: THE
RETURN OF SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL
APPELLATE REVIEW IN ILLINOIS
STEPHEN L. RICHARDS*

INTRODUCTION

The shocking number of men on Illinois' death row recently
exonerated has provoked a remarkable inquiry into the flaws in
our criminal justice system. Into a debate over criminal justice
once dominated by calls for harsher sentences, accelerated
appeals, and the weakening of constitutional guarantees, serious
consideration is being given-for nearly the first time-to the
question of why our justice system so often permits the conviction
of the innocent.! Courts, legislatures, and commissions are all
pondering procedural reforms which might address some of the
most common causes of wrongful conviction.
* Stephen L. Richards is the Deputy Defender, Death Penalty Trial
Assistance Division, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, a statewide
Illinois agency. He received his B.A. in 1976 from the University of Chicago
and his J.D. in 1983 from Brooklyn Law School. He is a former Instructor of
Legal Writing and Research at Illinois Institute of Technology (1984-86),
Chicago-Kent College of Law, a law clerk to the Honorable William G. Clark,
Justice, Illinois Supreme Court (1986-89), and an Assistant Public Defender in
the Law Office of the Cook County Public Defender (1989-2000), serving in the
Appeals, Felony Trial, and Homicide Task Force divisions, successively.
1. See generally BARRY SCHECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO
EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000)

(detailing cases of wrongfully convicted individuals who were eventually
exonerated); George F. Will, Innocent On Death Row, WASH. POST, Apr. 6,
2000, at A23, available in 2000 WL 2295245 (noting that Scheck's book
describes "true stories of blighted lives and justice traduced" by the conviction
of innocent capital defendants and "should change the argument about capital
punishment and other aspects of the criminal justice system. Conservatives,
especially, should draw this lesson from the book: Capital punishment, like
the rest of the criminal justice system, is a government program, so skepticism
is in order").
2. See, e.g., Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, String of Exonerations Spurs
Legislative, Judicial Panels to Study Reforms, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 16, 1999, at
N8, available in 1999 WL 2932558 (noting that the "Illinois General Assembly
and Illinois Supreme Court have ...

created four committees to study the

death penalty"); Bob Chiarito, House Panel Set to Consider Moratorium on
Executions, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 26, 2000, at 3 (discussing a proposed bill
"that would create an eight-member commission to study the law governing
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However, one source of the wrongful conviction of the
innocent-and a possible remedy to it-has been overlooked.
Illinois courts of review have always had the power to reverse
criminal convictions outright where the evidence is "so
unreasonable, improbable, or unsatisfactory as to justify a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt,"3 and where the evidence
does not leave the appellate court with an "abiding conviction of
guilt."'
Until the 1980's, Illinois courts exercised that power
frequently-even if somewhat cautiously. Subsidiary rules and
precedents which were applied to several categories of cases
recognized as likely to involve the conviction of the innocent
guided the courts in their exercise of that power. These categories
included convictions based upon: (1) hearsay, (2) uncorroborated
statements of the defendant, (3) accomplice testimony, (4)
circumstantial evidence, (5) doubtful identification testimony, (6)
conflicting or confusing testimony by multiple witnesses, (7)
incredible testimony by a single witness, and (8) evidence marred
by the failure either to call certain witnesses or to produce certain
evidence. This article will show that for most of their history, the
Illinois courts have frequently reversed convictions in all eight of
these categories.
In the mid-1980's, however, the tide began to turn. First, in
People v. Collins,5 and then in People v. Young,6 the Illinois
Supreme Court-citing the United States Supreme Court habeas
case of Jackson v. Virginia--adopted additional language and
standards which implied a far more deferential standard of
substantive review. This additional language does not require the
reviewing court to "'ask itself whether it believes that the evidence
the death penalty and its administration"); Ryan Keith, Task Force on Capital
Cases Calls for Videotaping of Suspects, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 16, 2000, at M6,
available in 2000 WL 3646355 (summarizing proposed "legislation that would
give defendants in capital cases more legal rights"); Steve Mills & Ken
Armstrong, Prosecutors Under Glare at Reform Hearing, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 28,
2000, at N20, available in 2000 WL 3631173 (noting that during hearings on
the reform of the Illinois death penalty system, it was suggested that an
independent commission be formed "to investigate wrongful convictions");
Evan Osnos & David Heinzmann, Death Penalty Remains an Option: Ryan's
Execution Halt Won't Deter Prosecutors, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 31, 2000, available in
2000 WL 3631835 (stating that Illinois Governor George Ryan "intends to
postpone any executions by granting reprieves to Death Row inmates until a
special panel can be created"); Maurice Possley & Ken Armstrong, Revamp
Urged in Handling of Capital Cases: Study Seeks Higher Attorney Standards,
CHI. TRIB., Nov. 4, 1999, at N1, available in 1999 WL 2928957 (describing
efforts for the "[cireation of a special capital litigation trial bar").

3. People v. Semenick, 195 N.E. 671, 672 (Ill. 1935).
4. People v. Ricili, 79 N.E.2d 509, 511 (Ill. 1948).
5. 478 N.E.2d 267, 276-77 (Ill. 1985). Collins involved accomplice
testimony. Id. at 277.
6. 538 N.E.2d 453 (Ill. 1989).
7. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
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at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."'8 Instead,
the relevant question is: "whether, after viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of
fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt."9
Following the adoption of the "light most favorable" language
from Jackson, the Illinois Supreme Court also began to discard the
specialized standards for the determination of reasonable doubt
which long prevailed both at trial and on appeal-most notably,
the standards for circumstantial evidence and sex cases. "o Even
where the Illinois Supreme Court retained specialized standards,
as in statement, accomplice, and identification cases, the court,
distinguishing prior precedents, began to affirm in circumstances
where it once would have reversed. And the number of convictions
reversed by all Illinois reviewing courts on reasonable doubt
grounds steadily dropped.
More recently, and perhaps in response to the large number
of exonerees, Illinois courts have begun what may be a return to
their traditional stricter scrutiny of criminal convictions. In the
most striking case, the Illinois Supreme Court recently reversed
outright the conviction of a man, Steven Smith, who had twice
been condemned to death."
This article has three purposes. First, it summarizes the rich
tradition of Illinois precedents for the reversal of convictions based
on reasonable doubt grounds. Second, it provides some guidance to
the defense practitioner as to how to use this body of tradition to
raise a reasonable doubt, particularly at trial. Last, this article
argues that it is time for Illinois courts to reject Jackson v.
Virginia, to readopt specialized standards of review, and to return
to the most important function any appellate court can hope to
perform: the protection of the innocent from wrongful conviction.

I.

HEARSAY

A long line of Illinois cases hold that the prosecution cannot
prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, an offense or an essential
element of an offense through hearsay.12 Indeed, the prosecution
8. Id. at 318 (quoting Woodby v. I.N.S., 385 U.S. 276, 282 (1966)).

9. Id. at 318-19. The Young court also cites this passage. Young, 538
N.E.2d at 473.
10. See People v. Schott, 582 N.E.2d 690, 695-97 (Ill. 1991) (abolishing the
"clear and convincing or substantially corroborated" requirement in sex
offenses); People v. Pintos, 549 N.E.2d 344, 346 (Ill. 1989) (abolishing
'reasonable hypothesis of innocence" test for purely circumstantial evidence

cases).
11. See People v. Smith, 708 N.E.2d 365 (Ill. 1999) (reversing the conviction

of Steven Smith).
12. See, e.g., People v. Lesure, 648 N.E.2d 1123, 1125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995);

People v. Hope, 387 N.E.2d 795, 799 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); People v. Clark, 440
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cannot prove a violation of probation through hearsay," even
though it only needs to show a probationary violation by a
preponderance of the evidence-not beyond a reasonable doubt.
This rule holds even when there is no timely objection to the
hearsay evidence and when the court has, therefore, properly
admitted it. Although the trier of fact may consider and give
"natural probative effect" to hearsay to which the defense has not
objected, 14 this rule does not allow the prosecution to prove an
offense or an element by hearsay alone. "Even when [hearsay] is
received without objection and thus considered competent, hearsay
evidence falls short of the proof necessary to deprive a man of his
liberty. " 15
In order to assess whether the prosecution's case rests on
hearsay, it is necessary to know what hearsay is. Illinois courts
define hearsay as "testimony of an out-of-court statement offered
to establish the truth of the matter asserted therein, and resting
for its value upon the credibility of the out-of-court asserter."16 For
example, John Smith, a witness at trial, testifies as to what Jane
Doe, who is not a witness, said or wrote at some time prior to trial.
The rationale behind the rule is that Jane's statements, untested
by cross-examination, are not reliable enough to warrant
consideration by the fact-finder.
While the general prohibition against hearsay is simple, its
application can be complex because of the large number of hearsay
exceptions. While the discussion of most of these exceptions is
beyond the scope of this article, counsel should be aware of them
and should be prepared to argue that they do not apply in a
particular case.
A good example of a recent Illinois conviction reversed
because it rested on hearsay is People v. Lesure.'7 In Lesure, the
defendant was charged with unlawful use of weapons by a felon. 8
The trial court heard a motion to quash and suppress evidence
simultaneously with the bench trial.'9 Although a court may admit
hearsay evidence in a motion to quash and suppress, it cannot
admit hearsay at trial. The evidence at trial was that an officer
responded to a report of a man with a gun." A man named
Matthews met the officer and told him that someone named
N.E.2d 387, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982); People v. Deatherage, 461 N.E.2d 631,
634 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
13. See, e.g., People v. Figueroa, 333 N.E.2d 586 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); People
v. Lewis, 329 N.E.2d 390, 394 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
14. People v. Williams, 563 N.E.2d 431, 437 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
15. Lewis, 329 N.E.2d at 393.
16. People v. Rogers, 411 N.E.2d 223, 226 (Ill. 1980).
17. 648 N.E.2d 1123 (111. App. Ct. 1995).
18. Id. at 1124.
19. Id.
20. Id.

20011

Return of Substantive CriminalAppellate Review in Illinois

499

"Ezell," who was driving a yellow Cadillac, had just pointed a rifle
at him and threatened to kill him.2 1 Apparently, the defense
offered no objection to the officer's testimony concerning the out-ofcourt assertion. At the conclusion of the motion and trial, the trial
judge granted the motion, suppressing the gun found in a2
neighbor's apartment, but nevertheless convicting the defendant.1
On appeal, the state argued, in part, that the court should
uphold the conviction because Matthews' statement was
admissible as an "excited utterance."22
The appellate court
rejected this conclusion, noting that there was no showing of an
absence of time to fabricate. 4 Since the only other evidence of the
defendant's unlawful use of weapons was his own statement,
which is not sufficient under the corpus delicti rule, 5 the appellate
court reversed the conviction. 6
Another common situation is the attempt to prove ownership
of stolen property via hearsay. For example, in People v. Hope, 7
the arresting officer found the defendant in a white, 1976
Oldsmobile 98.28 Although agents of the alleged victim, Nortown
Oldsmobile, testified that a 1976 Oldsmobile 98 had been stolen
and later returned, the prosecution offered no direct evidence
showing that the vehicle driven by the defendant was the one
owned by Nortown Oldsmobile. 29 The officer testified that he had
later been "informed" that the car driven by the defendant was
owned by Nortown Oldsmobile. ° The court found that this
statement was hearsay and, therefore, insufficient to convict.31
A codefendant's statements are also hearsay, and, unless
subject to some legally recognized exception, they cannot
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt. For example, in
People v. Deatherage,2 the defendant was present while an
undercover officer made a deal for cocaine with a codefendant. 2
When the undercover officer asked the codefendant about a
further purchase, the codefendant said he would have to "go
through that guy plus another guy," and the officer understood
"that guy" to mean the defendant. 4

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Lesure, 648 N.E.2d at 1125.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
See infra notes 82-119 and accompanying text.
Lesure, 648 N.E.2d at 1126.
387 N.E.2d 795 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979).
Id. at 796.
Id.
Id. at 798-99.
Id. at 798.
461 N.E.2d 631 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
Id. at 632.
Id. at 633.

The John Marshall Law Review

[34:495

The appellate court held that the trial court erred by
admitting the codefendant's statements because they were
hearsay."
Because there was no independent showing of a
conspiracy between the defendant and the codefendant, the
codefendant's statements were not admissible under the
coconspirator exception to the hearsay rule.36
Absent the
codefendant's statements, the state's case rested on the mere
presence of the defendant, which was insufficient to hold him
accountable."
Although the rule against conviction through hearsay
evidence has not weakened, the hearsay rule itself has slowly been
sapped by the Illinois Legislature's periodic enactment of new
hearsay exceptions. These include the following sections of the
Illinois Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963: 115-10, admitting
prior statements of child witness in a prosecution for a sex crime; 8

35. Id.
36. Id. at 633-34.
37. Deatherage, 461N.E.2d at 634.
38. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10 (West 2000). This section reads as
follows:
"§ 115-10. Certain hearsay exceptions.
(a) In a prosecution for a physical or sexual act perpetrated upon or against a
child under the age of 13, or a person who was an institutionalized severely or
profoundly mentally retarded person.. .the following evidence shall be
admitted as an exception to the hearsay rule:
(1) testimony by the victim of an out of court statement made by the victim
that he or she complained of such act to another; and
(2) testimony of an out of court statement made by the victim describing
any complaint of such act or matter or detail pertaining to any act
which is an element of an offense which is the subject of a prosecution
for a sexual or physical act against that victim.
(b) Such testimony shall only be admitted if:
(1) The court finds in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury
that the time, content, and circumstances of the statement provide
sufficient safeguards of reliability; and
(2) The child or institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded
person either:
(A) testifies at the proceeding; or
(B) is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of
the act which is the subject of the statement; and
(3) In a case involving an offense perpetrated against a child under the age
of 13, the out of court statement was made before the victim attained 13
years of age or within 3 months after the commission of the offense,
whichever occurs later, but the statement may be admitted regardless
of the age of the victim at the time of the proceeding.
(c) If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section, the court shall instruct
the jury that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credibility to be
given the statement and that, in making the determination, it shall consider
the age and maturity of the child, or the intellectual capabilities of the
institutionalized severely or profoundly mentally retarded person, the nature
of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made, and
any other relevant factor.
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115-10.1, admitting prior inconsistent sworn, written, or recorded
statements of a witness testifying at trial; 39 and 115-10.2,
admitting prior statements of a witness who refuses to obey a
judicial order to testify.4" But where a conviction rests only upon

(d) The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable
notice of his intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the
statement.
(e) Statements described in paragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) shall not
be excluded on the basis that they were obtained as a result of interviews
conducted pursuant to a protocol adopted by a Child Advocacy Advisory Board
as set forth in subsections (c), (d), and (e) of Section 3 of the Children's
Advocacy Center Act or that an interviewer or witness to the interview was or
is an employee, agent, or investigator of a State's Attorney's office."
Id.
39. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.1 (West 2000). This section reads as
follows:
"§ 115-10.1. Admissibility of Prior Inconsistent Statements. In all criminal
cases, evidence of a statement made by a witness is not made inadmissible by
the hearsay rule if
(a) the statement is inconsistent with his testimony at the hearing or trial,
and
(b) the witness is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and
(c)the statement(1) was made under oath at a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(2) narrates, describes, or explains an event or condition of which the
witness had personal knowledge, and
(A) the statement is proved to have been written or signed by the
witness, or
(B) the witness acknowledged under oath the making of the statement
either in his testimony at the hearing or trial in which the
admission into evidence of the prior statement is being sought, or at
a trial, hearing, or other proceeding, or
(C) the statement is proved to have been accurately recorded by a
tape recorder, videotape recording, or any other similar electronic
means of sound recording.
Nothing in this Section shall render a prior inconsistent statement
inadmissible for purposes of impeachment because such statement was not
recorded or otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth herein."
Id.
40. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/115-10.2 (West 2000). This section reads as
follows:
"§ 115-10.2. Admissibility of prior statements when witness refused to testify
despite a court order to testify.
(a) A statement not specifically covered by any other hearsay exception but
having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, is not
excluded by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable as defined in
subsection (c)and if the court determines that:
(1) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; and
(2) the statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through
reasonable efforts; and
(3) the general purposes of this Section and the interests of justice will best
be served by admission of the statement into evidence.
(b) A statement may not be admitted under this exception unless the
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an out-of-court statement, which is later disavowed at trial,
Illinois courts have struggled to determine whether proof beyond a
reasonable doubt can rest solely upon evidence which was, until
recently, considered hearsay. Illinois appellate courts continue to
state that a disavowed section 115-10.1 statement, standing alone,
can be sufficient to convict;4' however, at least four appellate court
decisions have found that defendants were not proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt where the prosecution's case rested
solely upon those recanted statements.42
43
For example, in People v. Parker,
the prosecution's case
rested upon the prior recorded statements of three witnesses, each
of whom recanted his testimony at trial.44 These prior recorded
statements all identified the defendant as the victim's killer. 4' The
first witness, whom the defendant allegedly shot during the same
incident, signed a written statement that he saw the defendant
shoot him (the witness) and the deceased victim. 46 At trial,
however, the witness testified that he did not actually see the

shooter; instead, he claimed that, while in great pain and while in

proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in advance of
the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair opportunity to
prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the statement, and the
particulars of the statement, including the name and address of the declarant.
(c) Unavailability as a witness is limited to the situation in which the
declarant persists in refusing to testify concerning the subject matter of the
declarant's statement despite an order of the court to do so.
(d) A declarant is not unavailable as a witness if exemption, refusal, claim or
lack of memory, inability or absence is due to the procurement or wrongdoing
of the proponent of a statement for purpose of preventing the witness from
attending or testifying.
(e) Nothing in this Section shall render a prior statement inadmissible for
purposes of impeachment because the statement was not recorded or
otherwise fails to meet the criteria set forth in this Section."
Id.
41. See People v. Bailey, 638 N.E.2d 192, 200 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994) (rejecting
the argument that "prior inconsistent statements alone are insufficient as a
matter of law" to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Curtis,
696 N.E.2d 372, 376-77 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that "a
recanted prior inconsistent statement admitted under section 115-10.1 of the
Code is not sufficient to sustain a conviction," reasoning that to do so would be
to accept "a now-discredited standard of appellate review in criminal cases
that would shift depending upon the nature of the trial evidence"); People v.
Zizzo, 703 N.E.2d 546, 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998) (rejecting the proposition that "a
recanted prior inconsistent statement cannot support a criminal conviction").
42. See generally People v. Parker, 600 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992);
People v. Reyes, 638 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993); People v. Arcos, 668
N.E.2d 1177 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996); People v. Brown, 709 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct.
1999).
43. 600 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992).
44. Id. at 530-33.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 530-31.
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the hospital for treatment of the gunshot wound, he signed the
statement just so the interrogating detective would leave his
hospital room.47
The second witness also signed a written
statement that he saw the defendant kill the deceased victim, but
at trial he said that he was not at the scene of the shooting and
that he only signed the statement because the interrogating
detectives told him he could be arrested for "withholding
information. " 8 The detective who took the second witness's
statement denied the threat.49 The third witness signed a written
statement that he saw the defendant with a gun shortly after the
shooting. ° At trial, he claimed to be present near the scene and
had seen the shooting, but he maintained that the defendant was
indoors when the shooting began.51 He claimed the detectives who
took the statement beat him and threatened to put him in jail for
"robbing the dead."" The detective who took the statement denied
beating the witness but admitted to threatening to charge him
with "robbing the dead."53
In a remarkable decision, the Parker court held that this
evidence was insufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 4 The court relied, in part, on two earlier cases, which
reversed verdicts where witnesses severely impeached their
testimony by prior inconsistent statements." The court reasoned
47. Id. at 531.
48. Parker,600 N.E.2d at 531-32.
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 532-33.
52. Id.
53. Parker,600 N.E.2d at 533.
54. Id. at 534-35.
55. Id. at 533-34 (citing People v. McCarthy, 430 N.E.2d 135 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981) & People v. Wise, 563 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)). In McCarthy,
the court found that discrepancies between the testimony of the State's
witnesses raised a reasonable doubt concerning the charges against defendant,
and therefore, the court held that the evidence was insufficient to support a
conviction for aggravated battery. McCarthy, 430 N.E.2d at 138-39. In Wise,
the victim testified at trial that the defendant grabbed him from behind in a
"bear hug" while a second person, Jones, walked up to him, pulled his gold
chain from around his neck and struck him in the eye. Wise, 563 N.E.2d at
1058. Before trial, the victim twice signed statements prepared by an
investigator for the defense. Id. Both statements exonerated the defendant.
Id. The second statement said that the defendant had not touched the victim
before the chain was taken from him and that the defendant and Jones had
started to fight each other after the chain was taken and the robbery was
complete. Id. at 1059. The victim admitted to signing the statements, but
claimed that he had only glanced at them and had signed them because he had
been assured that if he did so, he would not be required to appear in court. Id.
There is no indication that the signed statements were admitted into evidence
under section 115-10.1.
The appellate court reversed the defendant's
conviction outright on the grounds that the witness's credibility as to the
defendant's participation in the robbery had been severely impeached by the
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that here, conversely, the only evidence linking the defendant to
the murder-the three prior inconsistent statements-was
"severely impeached by the witnesses' trial testimony," which
"exculpated defendant and cast doubt on the authenticity of the
statements." 6 In addition, while the interrogating detectives had
denied the claims of coercion, the court noted that no "independent
investigation" ever refuted the claims."
Finally, no additional
evidence, physical or otherwise, corroborated the prior inconsistent
statements to link the defendant to the charged murder."
The appellate court has followed Parker at least three times.
In People v. Reyes," the chief evidence of the defendant's
participation in and accountability for first degree murder
consisted of the disavowed grand jury testimony of two witnesses,
which the judge admitted under section 115-10.1. Each witness
testified before the grand jury, in response to leading questions,
that the defendant had indeed taken part in the beating.60 At trial,
however, both witnesses testified that although they were present
when the beating started, they could not recall whether the
defendant had participated.6 1 One witness explained that she lied
before the grand jury, and the second witness "assumed" that she
must have misunderstood the prosecutor's questions.
One
witness testified, without contradiction by the prosecution, that
the prosecution had threatened to prosecute her if she did not

evidence of the prior inconsistent statements, particularly given the lack of
any corroborative evidence for the witness's trial testimony. Id. at 1059-60.
56. Parker, 600 N.E.2d at 534.
57. Id. This strange statement seems to have been prompted by the court's
attempt to factually distinguish a prior case, People v. McBounds, 536 N.E.2d
1225 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989), where the court upheld a defendant's conviction,
based at least partially on recanted section 115-10.1 statements.
In
McBounds, two witnesses, who originally implicated the defendant,
McBounds, recanted their testimony at trial. 536 N.E.2d at 1228-29. Their
prior signed written statements and, in the case of one of the witnesses, grand
jury testimony were admitted at trial. Id. at 1232. One witness claimed that
he had been beaten with a golf club by police before giving the statement. Id.
at 1229. The second witness claimed that she had been drinking and had been
held overnight by the police, who would not let her see her children before she
signed the statement. Id. at 1228-29. The McBounds court found that the
testimony of the witness who claimed to have been beaten with a golf club was
admissible, despite the claim of coercion, because the trial judge had heard the
testimony of an F.B.I. agent, who investigated the defendant's claim and
apparently found it to lack merit. Id. at 1233.
58. Id. at 534. The court distinguished McBounds on the ground that in
McBounds, "the prosecution's entire case did not rest on disavowed prior
inconsistent statements." Id. at 534.
59. 638 N.E.2d 650 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993).
60. Id. at 651-52.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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identify all of the participants in the beating."
Citing Parker, the appellate court held that the witnesses'
grand jury testimony was insufficient to refute their in-court
denials and the defendant's own sworn denial of guilt. 64 The court
found that the credibility of the witnesses' grand jury testimony
was fatally weakened by: (1) their recantations at trial; (2) the fact
that the grand jury statements consisted merely of "yes" and "no"
answers to leading questions from the prosecution; and (3) the
uncontradicted testimony of one witness that the prosecution had
coerced her.6"
In another case involving grand jury testimony, People v.
Arcos,66 the critical witness gave a written statement and grand
jury testimony which identified the defendant as the perpetrator of
the charged murder.67 At trial, however, he recanted the prior
testimony and written statements, saying that he had made the
earlier statements while he was under the influence of narcotics,
in fear for his life, and in return for a deal offered by the state.6"
He said that the police supplied him with all of the details of the
crime contained within his statement.6 9 Police officers took the
stand to deny all of these claims."0
The appellate court found the witness' prior testimony and
written statements insufficient to establish proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. After rejecting the defendant's argument that
Parker stood for the proposition that disavowed and
uncorroborated statements under section 115-10.1, standing alone,
could never establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
appellate court, nevertheless, found that the lack of corroboration
in Arcos was critical. Because the trial court specifically stated71
that the witness testifying at trial had "absolutely no credibility,"
and relied instead upon several pieces of allegedly corroborative
evidence, each bit of evidence had to be examined to determine
whether it supported the conviction. 2 The appellate court found
that none of the corroborative evidence actually corroborated the
key point at issue-the identification of the defendant as the
killer." Narrowly interpreted, Arcos rests upon both the trial
court's assessment of the witness as "absolutely" incredible and
the witness's mistaken reliance upon corroboration that did not
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 652.
Reyes, 638 N.E.2d at 653.
Id. at 653-54.
668 N.E.2d 1177 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996).
Id.
Id. at 1179.
Id.
Id.
Arcos, 668 N.E.2d at 1179.
Id. at 1180.
Id. at 1180-81.
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actually exist.
In a more recent decision, however, the appellate court has
interpreted Parker more broadly, coming close to holding that
uncorroborated and disavowed witness statements are not
admissible to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In People v.
Brown,74 the only admissible eyewitness testimony supporting the
prosecution's case of murder against the defendant consisted of a
handwritten, section 115-10.1 statement given by the witness two
years after the crime occurred. 9 At trial, the witness recanted the
statement, claiming that he had been placed under "extreme
pressure" by the police and prosecution, who threatened to charge
him with a gun or drug offense."8 The police and prosecutors,
however, denied these claims. The court held, nonetheless, that
the section 115-10.1 statement was insufficient to convince any
rational person that the defendant had been proven guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt.77
The court acknowledged prior cases, such as People v. Curtis,8
which rejected the argument that a section 115-10.1 statement
standing alone is insufficient to convict, but paraphrased them as
stating that the "fact that a conviction is based primarily on
recanted prior inconsistent statements does not as a matter of law
mean that the conviction cannot be sustained."79 The court went
on to distinguish the section 115-10.1 statements on the ground
that in all of these cases the state introduced additional physical
evidence linking the defendant to the crime charged.80 Citing the
"particular circumstances" of the case-(1) the lapse of time
between the event and the witness's statement, (2) the lack of
corroborative evidence, and (3) even the witness's claim that he
had feared being charged with a drug offense-the court found

74.
75.
76.
77.

709 N.E.2d 609 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 621.
Id. at 615-16.
Id. at 615-17, 620.

78. 696 N.E.2d 372 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
79. Brown, 709 N.E.2d at 620.
80. Id. The court characterized Zizzo and Curtis as resting on physical
evidence in addition to the disavowed section 115-10.1 statements. In Zizzo,
the prosecution charged the defendant with felony theft for allegedly taking
money from the victim's ATM account. People v. Zizzo, 703 N.E.2d 546, 547
(Ill. App. Ct. 1998).

Her alleged accomplice's prior sworn testimony at his

sentencing hearing, which he had repudiated at trial, was corroborated by the
discovery on the victim's ATM file of the defendant's fingerprint. Id. at 55152. The court considered this sufficient corroboration, even though the
defendant might have innocently handled the victim's ATM file as part of her
duties at the victim's bank. Id. at 552. In Curtis, the defendant's role in the
charged shooting and wounding of the victim, which otherwise rested on
recanted section 115-10.1 statements, was corroborated by the discovery of a
gun in defendant's bedroom, which had fired the bullet recovered from the
victim's leg. Curtis, 696 N.E.2d at 376.
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that the witness's disavowed section 115-10.1 statement was
insufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. 8'

The evolution of the appellate court's section 115-10.1reasonable doubt jurisprudence thus illustrates the tension
between the Collins-Young view of an appellate court's role, and
the very real reluctance of scrupulous appellate court judges to
affirm convictions where there is an obvious danger that an
innocent person might be convicted. On the one hand, a literal
reading of Collins and Young suggests that, if the appellate court
is to always view the evidence in the "light most favorable to the
prosecution," it should affirm the fact-finder's decision to disregard
the witness's trial testimony and believe the prior statement
instead, regardless of whether the prior statement is corroborated.
This is the view expressed by Justice Robert Steigmann in Curtis.
But if, on the other hand, the prior statement is in fact true, then
the witness has almost by definition lied under oath at trial. Can
the prior uncross-examined and uncorroborated statement of a
perjurious witness, which would normally amount to hearsay, ever
constitute proof beyond a reasonable doubt? Asked in this way,
the question can, and should, answer itself.
II. DEFENDANT'S UNCORROBORATED STATEMENTS: THE CORPUS
DELICTI RULE

The defendant's uncorroborated statements represent a
second major category of evidence that will not suffice to prove an
offense or an element of an offense. This rule is usually known by
the short-hand phrase, the "corpus delicti rule." Aside from the
constitutional rule that a conviction based upon an involuntary
statement cannot stand, the corpus delicti rule is an appellate
court's only substantive tool for guarding against wrongful
convictions based upon unreliable statements. While Illinois
courts continue to adhere to the rule, rejecting most prosecution
attempts to limit or overrule it, the courts also tend to interpret it
narrowly to the defendant's detriment.
Notwithstanding, the corpus delicti rule still stands as a
necessary element of an offense:
It is a basic concept in the criminal law that proof of a criminal
offense involves the proof of two distinct propositions or facts beyond

a reasonable doubt. First, that a crime was committed, and second,
that it was committed by the person or persons charged. In other

words, "the corpus delicti must be proved and the identity of the
defendant as the guilty party established."82
81. Brown, 709 N.E.2d at 620-21.
82. People v. Lambert, 472 N.E.2d 427, 428 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (quoting
People v. Kirilenko, 115 N.E.2d 297 (Ill. 1953)).
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However, "corpus delicti cannot be proved by defendant's
Instead, there must be "either some
confession alone."83
independent evidence or corroborating evidence outside of the
confession which tends to establish that a crime occurred."84 The
rationale of the rule is that "[e]xperience has shown that untrue
confessions may be given to gain publicity, to shield another, to
avoid apparent peril, or for other reasons, and because of this, the
law demands corroborating proof that a crime did in fact occur
When the
before the individual is punished therefor."8
prosecution charges two different offenses, it must present
corroborating evidence for each offense.86 The rule also applies,
apparently, even when the defendant's statement does not result
from custodial interrogation.87
While no cases directly address this issue, the state
apparently must also independently corroborate for each element
8
the defendant
of each offense. For example, in People v. Lesure,"
was charged with unlawful use of weapons by a felon.88 The state
adequately proved the element that the defendant was a felon by a
stipulation to his prior conviction. 8 Because the court suppressed
the gun in a simultaneous motion, the only evidence as to the
unlawful use element was the defendant's admission to an officer
that the gun belonged to him.8 ' The court found that this was
insufficient under the corpus delicti rule. 2
The Illinois courts have recognized two major exceptions to
the corpus delicti rule. First, the rule does not apply to proof of
the defendant's age, where defendant's age is an element of the
charged offense. 3 The rationale for this exception is that:
[A]n admission of one's birth date is not subject to the peculiar
perceptions or recollections of a defendant who is under the
psychological pressures of an arrest ....It appears to be inherently
more reliable than a statement of what one did, or saw, or heard, or
94
thought because it is a statement of an immutable characteristic.
Second, Illinois courts have held that the corpus delicti rule
does not apply in probation revocation proceedings. 95 Nonetheless,
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. People v. O'Neil, 165 N.E.2d 319, 321 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960).
86. People v. Kokoraleis, 501 N.E.2d 207, 226-27 (Ill. 1986).
App. Ct. 1983) (upholding
87. In re D.A., 448 N.E.2d 1036, 1038 (Ill.
defendant's conviction based upon telephone admission and letter to friend).
88. 648 N.E.2d 1123 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
89. Id. at 1124.
90. Id. at 1125.

91. Id. at 1124.
92. Id. at 1124-25.
93. People v. Dalton, 434 N.E.2d 1127, 1130-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982).

94. Id. at 1131.
95. People v. Woznick, 663 N.E.2d 1037, 1039 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
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corpus delicti issues commonly concern areas such as proof of
"force" or "penetration" for sexual offenses, "taking" for robbery,
and "criminal responsibility" for arson.
A.

Sexual Offenses

In two instances, courts have found that there was
insufficient proof apart from the defendant's confession to sustain
charges of sexual crimes. In People v. Lambert,96 the defendant
was charged with an act of indecent liberties with a four year old
child. The child did not testify.97 Although there was testimony
that the defendant admitted to sucking the child's penis and
rubbing his penis against the child's buttock, the only
corroboration of the statement was the fact that the defendant had
access to the child's sleeping quarters and that three weeks after
the date of the charged offense the child's rectum appeared to a
police officer to be "pinkish and swollen."98 The court concluded
that in the absence of medical testimony as to the cause of the
child's condition, there was insufficient evidence to corroborate the
confession.99
Similarly, in People v. Kokoraleis,"' the defendant was
charged with murder and rape. The police found the victim's body
five months after her abduction and murder. Although her body
was fully clothed, her pants were split "along the inseam from the
back to front along the crotch.""°' Citing the time lapse between
the murder and the discovery of the victim's body, the court
concluded that the split inseam did not independently corroborate
the defendant's confession to rape." 2 In many rape cases, however,
Illinois courts have found that somewhat greater evidence of force
or penetration will suffice to corroborate the defendant's
confession.' 3
96. 472 N.E.2d 427 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984).
97. Id. at 428.
98. Id. at 428-29.
99. Id. at 429.
100. 501 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986).
101. Id. at 224-27.
102. Id. at 218.
103. See People v. Perfecto, 186 N.E.2d 258, 259 (Ill. 1962) (finding that
defendant's confession to rape was corroborated by evidence of bodily injury to
defendant and to victim); People v. Bounds, 662 N.E.2d 1168, 1185 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1995) (finding that defendant's confession to aggravated criminal sexual
assault and aggravated kidnapping of the victim was adequately corroborated
by evidence of a scream heard by a neighbor at the time of the abduction,
absence of all clothing except a T-shirt on the victim's body, contusions and
abrasions on the victim's body, dilation of the victim's anus, and a broom
handle smeared with feces); People v. Cloutier, 622 N.E.2d 774, 785 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1993) (finding that defendant's confession admitting to nonconsensual
intercourse was sufficiently corroborated by evidence of blood on the victim's
genitalia consistent with intercourse during menses, nude condition of the
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B. Armed Robbery
Cases involving armed robbery or attempted armed robbery
present similar considerations. In the leading case of People v.
Lee,"4 the prosecution charged the defendant with murder and
attempted armed robbery." 5 The only corroborating evidence
offered to substantiate the defendant's statement that he told the
victim to give him money was the fact that the victim was shot by
a stranger at 7:00 p.m.' 6 The victim's own statements in the
emergency room before his death only indicated that he had been
beaten and shot but did not indicate that he had been the victim of
The court found that the
an attempted armed robbery. 117
confession of an attempted armed robbery was uncorroborated,
and it reversed the lower court."'
C. Arson
Lastly, three reported cases have reversed for failure to prove
In the leading case of People v.
criminal responsibility for arson.
body, slight bruises and abrasions, as well as other crime evidence); People v.
Darnell, 419 N.E.2d 384, 384 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (finding defendant's
confession to rape corroborated by abrasions on the defendant's genitalia and
the fact that the body of the victim was found, one day after the rape, with her
shorts pulled down below her buttocks); People v. Lloyd, 660 N.E.2d 43, 48 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1995) (finding defendant's confession to aggravated criminal sexual
assault to be corroborated by the victim's shaken emotional condition upon
reporting the incident to the police, injury to her head, and a belt wrapped
around her neck, as well as properly admitted prior inconsistent statements of
two defense witnesses, admitted as substantive evidence).
104. 502 N.E.2d 399 (Ill. App. Ct. 1996).
105. Id. at 405.
106. Id. at 413.
107. Id.
108. Id. However, in cases involving only slightly greater proof, it has been
held that confessions of attempted armed robbery or armed robbery were
sufficiently corroborated. See People v. Neal, 489 N.E.2d 845, 850 (Ill. 1985)
(finding defendant's admission to armed robbery to be corroborated by
evidence that the victim's bedroom had been ransacked and that the victim's
purse was missing); People v. Willingham, 432 N.E.2d 861, 864-66 (Ill. 1982)
(finding that the defendant's admission to attempted armed robbery,
consisting of the statement that he accompanied codefendants to the scene of
the murder after discussion of a possible armed robbery, was sufficiently
corroborated by evidence of independent witnesses that defendant drove to the
victim's apartment and was seen there shortly before the crime occurred);
People v. Montes, 549 N.E.2d 700, 705-07 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (finding evidence
that the victim was shot to death on a city street at 1 a.m., as confirmed by
independent witnesses, the shooter fleeing immediately afterwards,
sufficiently corroborated defendant's admission that he acted as a lookout
during the attempted armed robbery); People v. Morando, 523 N.E.2d 1061,
1068 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (finding evidence that defendant displayed and
offered to sell a ring resembling that worn by the victim on the day of her
death sufficiently corroborated defendant's admission to armed robbery).
109. See generally People v. Lueder, 121 N.E. 743 (Ill. 1954); In re D.A., 448
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Lueder,"' the defendant's confession to the arson of a tool shed was
supplemented only by the testimony of the owner of the tool shed
that it had been gutted by fire."' In the absence of evidence that
"some person willfully fired the building," the defendant's
conviction was reversed."'
Similarly, in In re D.A.," the
defendant admitted to setting a fire in a bathroom."' Although a
fire investigator testified that the charged fire started in a second
floor bathroom, he did not testify that the fire had been
deliberately started or that the fire was of human origin, and the
court reversed the defendant's conviction."' Finally, in People v.
Hougas,"' the defendant's confession of committing arson by
burning a barn filled with hay was neither sufficiently
corroborated by her presence in a house near the barn at the time
the fire started, nor by the hostility between her and her husband
which was alleged as the motive for the fire." 7 Again, the court
relied on the absence of independent evidence that the fire had
been willfully set."8
D. The Corpus Delecti Rule in Practice
The corpus delicti rule usually comes into play in one of two
sets of circumstances: (1) the victim has been murdered and the
defendant confesses both to the murder and to a second crime such
as rape or robbery, or (2) the defendant confesses to a crime other
than murder and the victim is, for whatever reason, not available
to testify. Since both situations are by no means uncommon, the
criminal defense attorney should be ready to argue corpus delicti
at the motion for directed finding. Similarly, stipulations to other
evidence which might independently tend to show the corpus
delicti, such as medical records in a rape or battery case, should be
avoided. In a jury trial, where an argument can be made that the
non-confession evidence is incredible or insufficient, counsel may
want to prepare a non-IPI instruction which will convey to the jury

N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); People v. Hougas, 234 N.E.2d 63 (Ill. App. Ct.
1968).
110. 121 N.E.2d 743 (Ill. 1954).
111. Id. at 744.
112. Id. at 745.
113. 448 N.E.2d 1036 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983).
114. Id. at 1038.
115. Id. at 1039.
116. 234 N.E.2d 63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
117. Id. at 65-66.
118. Id. at 66. But see People v. O'Neil, 165 N.E.2d 319 (Ill. 1960) (finding
that the confession was corroborated by the defendant's attempt to break into
the building some days after the fire, detailed confirmation of where he stated
that the fire had been set, and by his attempt to commit suicide while in
custody).

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:495

the essence of the corpus delicti rule."9
III. ACCOMPLICE TESTIMONY
Unlike hearsay or the uncorroborated statements of a
defendant, the testimony of an accomplice, even if uncorroborated,
can sustain a conviction. Illinois has long adhered to the common
law rule that uncorroborated accomplice testimony may be
"sufficient to warrant a conviction if it satisfied the jury beyond a
reasonable doubt.""'
However, Illinois courts have frequently
expressed their dissatisfaction with convictions resting upon
accomplice testimony. The classic statement of Illinois' position
with respect to the "nagging problem of the weight which is to be
accorded to the uncorroborated testimony of accomplice
witnesses, " "' is found in People v. Hermens:
It is... universally recognized that such testimony has inherent
weaknesses, being testimony of a confessed criminal and fraught
with dangers of motives such as malice toward the accused, fear,
threats, promises or hopes of leniency, or benefits from the
prosecution which must always be taken into consideration ....[Ilt
is not regarded with favor, is discredited by the law, should be
weighed with care, is subject to grave suspicion, should be viewed
with distrust, and ... it should be scrutinized carefully and acted
upon with caution .... This court has also said that where it
appears the witness has hopes of reward from the prosecution, his
testimony should not be accepted unless it carries with it the
absolute conviction of its truth.
It is therefore apparent, from the regard of the courts for this type of
evidence, that material corroboration or direct contradiction [of the
22
suspect accomplice testimony] are entitled to considerable weight.1
Given the perceived infirmities of accomplice testimony and
the rule that, in order to be accepted, accomplice testimony must
carry with it "the absolute conviction of truth," it is not surprising
that courts have reversed a large number of accomplice-based
convictions.'
Indeed, in the recent case of In re D.R.S. ,24 the
119. For example, the jury might be instructed that, "You have before you
evidence that the defendant made a statement. The law requires that there
must be some evidence, independent of the defendant's statement,
demonstrating that each crime charged in the indictment occurred. In
determining whether a crime occurred, you may consider any evidence apart
from the statement which corroborates, or supports, the facts contained in the
statement."
120. People v. Hermens, 125 N.E.2d 500, 504 (Ill. 1955).
121. People v. Price, 316 N.E.2d 289, 294 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
122. Hermans, 125 N.E.2d at 504-05 (emphasis added).
123. For sampling of the numerous cases reversed because of failure to
establish an absolute truth in an accomplice witness's testimony, see People v.
Ash, 468 N.E.2d 1153, 1156 (Ill. 1984); In re Brown, 374 N.E.2d 209, 210 (Ill.
1978); People v. Bugg, 176 N.E. 717, 719 (Ill. 1931); People v. Harvey, 152 N.E.
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court asked: "Is it possible.., to presume a defendant to be
innocent, view an admitted criminal's testimony with the utmost
suspicion, and still find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt based solely upon the uncorroborated testimony of a
criminal?"'25 After surveying the case law, the court concluded
that in only three instances had the Illinois Supreme Court
affirmed convictions on accomplice testimony that was "even close"
to being uncorroborated."'
Nevertheless, the Illinois Supreme
Court continues to state the general rule that uncorroborated
accomplice testimony can suffice for conviction, most recently in
People v. Rivera.'27
Corroboration, however, remains important in determining
whether a court will uphold an accomplice-based conviction. In
the context of accomplice testimony, "corroboration" means
corroboration as to the accomplice's identification of the defendant
as a perpetrator, and not merely corroboration that a crime
occurred. 2 In a large number of accomplice testimony reversals,
the courts characterize the accomplice's testimony as wholly or
partially uncorroborated.129
Conversely, cases affirming
accomplice-based convictions often emphasize the existence of
corroboration.
Accomplice testimony often creates weaknesses in the
prosecution's ability to establish the corpus delicti for a variety of
reasons. Courts frequently cite to contradiction of an accomplice's
testimony, either by other accomplices or by the defendant

147, 149 (Ill. 1926); People v. Hudson, 173 N.E. 278, 279 (Ill. 1930); People v.
Newell, 469 N.E.2d 1375, 1377-78 (Ill. 1984); People v. Rendas, 9 N.E.2d 237,
242-43 (Ill. 1937); People v. Williams, 357 N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (Ill. 1976);
People v. Wilson, 362 N.E.2d 291, 292 (Ill. 1977); In re D.R.S., 643 N.E.2d 839,
843 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); People v. Gnat, 519 N.E.2d 497, 499-500 (Ill. App. Ct.
1988); People v. Kiel, 394 N.E.2d 883, 887 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979); People v.
Marshall, 326 N.E.2d 246, 250-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975); People v. Mostafa, 274
N.E.2d 846, 860-61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971); People v. Price, 316 N.E.2d 289, 294-97
(Ill. App. Ct. 1974); People v. Savory, 379 N.E.2d 372, 373-74 (Ill. App. Ct.
1978); People v. Seymour, 368 N.E.2d 1018 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
124. 643 N.E.2d at 843.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 843-44.
127. 652 N.E.2d 307, 311 (Ill. 1995).
128. Ash, 468 N.E.2d at 1157; In re D.R.S., 643 N.E.2d at 843: Williams, 357
N.E.2d at 530; Wilson, 362 N.E.2d at 293.
129. See, e.g., People v. Jimerson, 535 N.E.2d 889, 903-04 (Ill. 1989) (finding
that a properly admitted prior consistent statement and defendant's flight
corroborated the accomplice witness's testimony); People v. Kubat, 447 N.E.2d
247, 260 (Ill. 1983) (finding that other witnesses who placed defendant
together with accomplice on the day of the crime corroborated the accomplice's
testimony); Rivera, 652 N.E.2d at 311-12 (prior inconsistent testimony of
defense witness, also an accomplice, identifying defendant as participant,
corroborated state's accomplice witness).
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himself, as raising a reasonable doubt.' ° Courts have also been
prone to reverse where the accomplice's testimony was
contravened by evidence of the defendant's good character.'
Similarly, the suspicion which normally attaches to the testimony
of the accomplice may be heightened by additional factors.
Although most accomplices testify in return for some consideration
from the prosecution, courts have been suspicious of accomplice
testimony which is given in return for immunity from
133
prosecution 13

2

or for permission to plead to reduced charges,

dismissal of charges,3 4 a reduction in a sentence already
imposed, 3 1 or executive clemency resulting in an immediate
release from prison.13 ' Lesser consideration, such as a promise to
recommend probation, may also be important. 137 Evidence of the
accomplice's addiction or intoxication may also detract from his
credibility.' 3 1

Lastly,

many

cases

have

emphasized

prior

130. See People v. Hermens, 125 N.E.2d 500, 505 (Ill. 1955) (finding that the
testimony of an accomplice testifying for prosecution was contradicted by a
second accomplice and by the defendant); People v. Newell, 469 N.E.2d 1375,
1378 (Ill. 1984) (stating that in a situation in which one accomplice implicates
the defendant for the prosecution and two other accomplices exonerate the
defendant, then "with no corroboration of either view, we simply cannot say
that there has been proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt"); People v.
Marshall, 326 N.E.2d 246, 249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (finding the inculpatory
testimony of one accomplice contradicted by a second accomplice, called by the
defense, who stated that defendant did not participate in the burglary).
However, in Rivera, the court distinguished Newell, calling it a "very factspecific case." Rivera, 652 N.E.2d at 311.
131. See, e.g., Mostafa, 274 N.E.2d at 861; Price, 316 N.E.2d at 296; Rendas,
9 N.E.2d at 242.
132. See In re D.R.S., 643 N.E.2d at 844 (granting immunity from
prosecution for all liability for burglary and theft); People v. Kiel, 394 N.E.2d
883, 884 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979) (granting immunity from prosecution for
conspiracy to commit murder); People v. Seymour, 368 N.E.2d 1018, 1020 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1977) (dismissing unrelated charges in exchange for testifying);
Newell, 469 N.E.2d at 471 (granting immunity from prosecution for burglary);
Wilson, 362 N.E.2d at 292-93 (granting immunity from prosecution for armed
robbery).
133. See Marshall, 326 N.E.2d at 248 (reducing charge from murder to
involuntary manslaughter); Price, 316 N.E.2d at 291 (reducing charge from
murder to armed robbery).
134. See Ash, 468 N.E.2d at 1155-56 (dismissing the home invasion and
unlawful restraint charge against accomplice); Mostafa, 274 N.E.2d at 852
(dismissing the murder charge against accomplice).
135. Mostafa, 274 N.E.2d at 852-53 (reducing the 40 to 75 year sentences
against two accomplices to murder to 15 to 30 years in exchange for testimony
against the defendant).
136. Williams, 357 N.E.2d at 528 (granting executive clemency to an
accomplice serving a 15 to 30 year prison term).
137. See Gnat, 519 N.E.2d at 498 (promising to recommend probation or
minimal punishment).
138. See id. at 499 (noting that the accomplice witness was a periodic cocaine
and marijuana user); Kiel, 394 N.E.2d at 886 (stating that the witness had
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inconsistent statements or recantations of the accomplice
witness. '"
Where accomplice testimony is substantially corroborated, or
where other circumstances dictate a jury trial, it is incumbent
upon trial counsel to tender the standard Illinois Pattern
Instruction on accomplice testimony. 4 ° This instruction tells the
jury that the testimony of an accomplice witness "is subject to
suspicion and should be considered by you with caution." 141 A
failure to tender the instruction has recently resulted14 2 in a finding
that defense counsel did not give effective assistance.
Moreover, in order to have a right to the instruction,
defendant need not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
witness is guilty of the crime charged, nor is it required that the
accomplice witness have been indicted or arrested.
All the
defendant must show is that the evidence at trial establishes
probable cause to believe that the witness has participated in the
crime charged.'
Where the witness, rather than the defendant,
could have been the person responsible for the crime, the
defendant is entitled to have the accomplice-witness instruction
given to the jury. 44 In particular, if a witness admits presence at
the scene of the crime-and thus, could have been indicted either
as a principal or under a theory of accountability-but denies
45
involvement, then a defendant is entitled to the instruction.
IV.

CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

At one time, cases resting on purely circumstantial evidence
were evaluated under a special standard, both at trial and on

used so much mescaline at the time of the occurrence that it was "burning
out" his brain); Marshall, 326 N.E.2d at 250 (noting that the witness was an

unemployed heroin addict).
139. In re Brown, 374 N.E.2d at 210 (noting that the witness originally
stated that either the defendant or an unidentified second person was the
shooter); Kiel, 394 N.E.2d at 887 (stating that the witness testified under oath
at a preliminary hearing that he had no memory of the charged event); Price,
316 N.E.2d at 296 (noting that the witness admitted that he failed to tell the
police "all the truth"); Seymour, 368 N.E.2d at 1020 (noting that witnesses
denied the truth of prior inculpatory statements at the probation revocation
hearing); Williams, 357 N.E.2d at 529 (stating that the witness admitted
testifying falsely at his own trial and giving false statement to prosecutor).
140. Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Crim.) 3.17 (4th Ed. West 2000).
141. Id.
142. See People v. Campbell, 657 N.E.2d 87, 90-92 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
143. See People v. Henderson, 568 N.E.2d 1234, 1261 (Ill. 1991) (noting
standard for receiving this jury instruction).
144. See People v. Montgomery, 626 N.E.2d 1254, 1260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)
(finding that because the accomplice could have been responsible for the crime
that the court should have given the accomplice-witness jury instruction).
145. See People v. Lewis, 609 N.E.2d 673, 676 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) (finding
the defendant entitled to the accomplice-witness instruction).
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appeal. Under this special standard, the prosecution was required
to show that every reasonable hypothesis of innocence had been
excluded, 146 and that there was a "reasonable and moral certainty
that the accused had committed the offense." 4 v
In the late 1980's, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
abolished the reasonable hypothesis test, first at the trial level" 8
and then on appeal. 14
Henceforward, cases resting on
circumstantial evidence alone were to be evaluated with what the
court called the "reasonable doubt," or the Collins-Young test. The
following sections discuss three common types of circumstantial
evidence: (1) opportunity, (2) flight, and (3) fingerprints.
A

Opportunity

The general rule is that opportunity alone is not sufficient to
sustain a conviction unless the prosecution proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that only the defendant, and no one else, had the
opportunity to commit the crime."0O For example, in People v.
Dowaliby, a case which received a great deal of notorious publicity,
the defendant was accused of murdering his daughter."' Her
strangled body was found in a thicket or brush some distance from
the home that the defendant shared with his wife and mother."'
The court reversed the defendant's conviction, finding that the
prosecution failed to prove that only the defendant had the
opportunity to commit the crime." 3 The court noted that the
defendant's wife or mother had an equally good opportunity to
commit the crime, and it hypothesized that an intruder could have
committed the crime. 154
Another case which turned strongly upon the issue of
opportunity is People v. Holsapple."5 In that case, the defendant
left a tavern with the victim at around 12:15 a.m."' The victim
146. See, e.g., People v. Garrett, 339 N.E.2d 753, 759 (Ill. 1976) (reiterating
that where a conviction rests solely on circumstantial evidence, guilt must be
established so as to "exclude every other reasonable hypothesis").
147. People v. Mitchell, 375 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978).

148. People v. Bryant, 499 N.E.2d 413, 419-20 (Ill. 1986) (holding that the
"reasonable theory of innocence" jury instruction should not be used at trial).
149. People v. Pintos, 549 N.E.2d 344, 348 (Ill. 1989) (holding that based on

Bryant, the "reasonable theory of innocence" standard should not be used for
appeals).
150. See People v. Dowaliby, 582 N.E.2d 1243, 1249 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991)
(maintaining that opportunity alone is insufficient to sustain a conviction);
People v. Jenkins, 452 N.E.2d 867, 873 (1983) (holding that opportunity alone
is not sufficient).
151. Dowaliby, 582 N.E.2d at 1249.

152. Id. at 1246.
153. Id. at 1250.
154. Id. at 1249.
155. 333 N.E.2d 683 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).

156. Id. at 685.
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was found murdered in her home forty-one hours later. 117 There
was evidence that the victim argued with an unidentified man
around 2:30 a.m., 158 and the medical evidence established that she
died no more than twenty-four hours afterwards." 9 Although some
circumstantial evidence suggested that the defendant was in the
victim's home sometime during that period, the court concluded
that the evidence did not adequately exclude the reasonable
hypothesis that someone else murdered her. 6 °
B. Flight, Concealment, Etc.
1.

Flight

The general rule is that flight from the scene of the crime may
have some probative value as showing the defendant's
consciousness of guilt; "[h]owever, flight from the scene of the
crime is not sufficient in itself to sustain a conviction. " 161
Moreover, the probative value of evidence of flight is conditioned
upon the flight bearing some reasonable relationship to the
defendant's consciousness of guilt. 6 '
In a number of cases, courts have reversed convictions despite
evidence of flight, often finding that there was a reasonable
alternative explanation for the defendant's conduct. For example,
in People v. Gomez," 3 the defendant traveled to Kenosha,
Wisconsin shortly after the murder of his landlady and later went
to Texas."
While in Wisconsin, however, the defendant
voluntarily contacted the police for help on another matter and
voluntarily returned to Illinois to answer questions, as well as to
provide hair, fingerprints, and blood samples. 6' In Texas, the
defendant remained within a few miles of the Mexican border,
making no attempt to leave the United States even after he
learned that there was a warrant for his arrest.'6 6 The court

157. Id. at 686.
158. Id. at 687.
159. Id. at 688.
160. Holsapple, 333 N.E.2d. at 694.
161. People v. LaGardo, 376 N.E.2d 62, 64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (noting the
general rule concerning flight from the crime scene).
162. See People v. Herbert, 196 N.E. 821, 825 (Ill. 1935) (defining the nature
of flight as "not merely a leaving, but a leaving or concealment under a
consciousness of guilt and for the purpose of evading arrest"); People v.
Cokely, 360 N.E.2d 545, 547 (111. App. Ct. 1977) (maintaining that
circumstantial evidence of flight must bear a reasonable relationship to the
defendant's consciousness of guilt); LaGardo, 376 N.E.2d at 64 (maintaining
that the flight must be reasonably related to a consciousness of guilt).
163. 574 N.E.2d 822 (1ll. App. Ct. 1991).
164. Id. at 825, 829.
165. Id. at 825-26.
166. Id. at 825.
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concluded that evidence of flight was "improbable" and reversed.167
2. Concealment
Similar considerations apply to circumstantial evidence of
concealment or false statements to police. For example, in People
v. Garrett,"8 where the issue was whether the defendant shot his
lover or whether she committed suicide, the Illinois Supreme
Court found that the defendant's acts of leaving the scene of death
and hiding the shotgun were "equally consistent with the
hypothesis that these were the actions of an innocent man acting
in panic."'69 Similarly, in People v. Ware, 7' the defendant's false
denial to the police that he had ever been to the murder victim's
171
apartment did not "clearly evidence his knowledge of guilt,"

because defendant's roommate, the actual killer, may have
confessed to the defendant
and the defendant "may have feared
172
guilt by association."

C. Fingerprints
A special problem is presented by fingerprint evidence. The
general rule is that to sustain a conviction based solely on
fingerprint evidence, the defendant's fingerprints "must have been
found in the immediate vicinity of the crime under such
circumstances as to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the
fingerprints were impressed at the time the crime was
committed."'73
In three reported cases, prosecutorial failure to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that the impression of the defendants'
fingerprints occurred during commission of the crime charged
resulted in reversals of the convictions. In the first case, People v.
Donahue, the decedent was found suffocated in her apartment. 75
The court noted that "[h]er head was covered with plastic bags
which were tied around her neck with two cords. One of the cords
167. Id. at 829-30.
168. 339 N.E.2d 753 (Ill. 1975).
169. Id. at 763.
170. 402 N.E.2d 762, (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
171. Id. at 768.
172. Id. at 768-69.

173. People v. Rhodes, 422 N.E.2d 605, 608 (Ill.
1981).

See also People v.

Malmenato, 150 N.E.2d 806, 812 (Ill. 1958) (noting that several burglary tools
bearing defendant's fingerprints in the immediate vicinity was sufficient for a
jury determination of the issue); People v. Taylor, 204 N.E.2d 734, 736 (Ill.
1965) (noting the rule that the fingerprint evidence must be of such a type
that the presence of the prints could not be "explained by public accessibility of
the place ... and the possibility that the prints were made at a time other
than when the offense occurred").
174. 365 N.E.2d 710 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
175. Id. at 711.

2001]

Return of Substantive CriminalAppellate Review in Illinois

519

was attached to a steam iron." 76 The defendant's fingerprint was
found on the bottom of the steam iron. 7 7 The decedent's sister,
however, testified for the defense that the week before the murder,
the victim had entertained a man at her apartment who "looked
similar" to the defendant.7 8 The court found that the prosecution's
case failed to prove more than a probability that the defendant
had been in the decedent's apartment. 79 The court concluded that
the prosecution failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the murder.' 80
Similarly, in People v. Gomez,"" the police found the
defendant's fingerprint on an open kitchen drawer, which had
apparently been ransacked at the time the victim, the defendant's
landlady, was murdered. 8 However, the defendant testified that
he had entered the kitchen twice before to pay his rent to the
victim. 8 ' Although the police found the defendant's fingerprint
twelve feet from the area in which the victim had allowed tenants
to stand while paying their rent, the court noted that some tenants
would sometimes stand outside that area. 84 The court concluded
that the fingerprint, even when considered in combination with
other physical evidence and evidence of the defendant's flight, was
insufficient to prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 85
The third case reversing for failure to prove temporal and
81 6
physical proximity of the defendant's fingerprint, People v. Ware,
turned upon the issue of accountability. 87 Prior to trial, the
defendant's codefendant, who was also his roommate, pled guilty
to the murders and armed robberies of the two victims.'88 The
circumstantial evidence against the defendant included his
fingerprint on a glass found at the victims' apartment, the scene of
the murders. 8 Other evidence established that the fingerprint
must have been placed no earlier than several hours before the
murders took place.'
Despite additional evidence that a witness
saw the defendant outside the victim's apartment building close to

176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 711-12.
Donahue, 365 N.E.2d at 712.
Id.
574 N.E.2d 822 (IM.App. Ct. 1991).
Id. at 824.

183. Id. at 827.
184. Id. at 827-28.
185. Id. at 829-30.
186. 402 N.E.2d 762 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).

187. Id. at 769.
188. Id. at 763, 768.

189. Id. at 766-67.
190. Id.
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the time of the murders and the fact that the defendant falsely
told the police that he had never been to the apartment building,
the court nonetheless concluded that the defendant had not been
proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.' The prosecution could
"not exclude the possibility" that the defendant had left the
apartment before the murders were committed, and the remaining
evidence was too slight
to establish that he had acted as a lookout
19
for the actual killer.

Where there is no evidence that the defendant has ever been
to the scene of the crime, the prosecution can apparently establish
temporal and physical proximity without scientific proof of the age
of the fingerprint. For example, in each of the three burglary
cases consolidated for appeal in People v. Rhodes, 9' the Illinois
Supreme Court found that the fingerprint evidence, standing
alone, was sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt. 94 In two of
the cases,'9 ' the defendants' fingerprints were found on shards of
window glass, the windows having been broken at the time of
entry. 99 In one of these two cases, there was no evidence that the
State tested the print for age, but the owner of the house neither
knew the defendant nor gave him permission to enter.9 ' In the
other, there was testimony that the presence of body "oil" on the
fingerprint demonstrated it was fresh. 99 Although the defendant
lived in the neighborhood, the court rejected as unreasonable the
possibility that he could have walked up to the window, forty feet
from the public sidewalk and innocently left his fingerprint.' 99
Finally, in a third case, a fingerprint technician discovered
the defendant's fingerprint on a clock radio,"' which had
apparently been moved from its usual position during the
burglary."' The court found proof beyond a reasonable doubt
despite the prosecution's failure to show "whether the clock radio
was new or used when the victim got it, how long it had been since
the clock radio was last outside the dwelling, or who might have
touched it when removed from the dwelling.""'0

191. Ware, 402 N.E.2d at 769.
192. Id. at 768. The court later concluded that while this "evidence 'creates a
strong suspicion that the defendant may have been connected with the
offenses ....[it] does not establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" Id. at
769 (quoting People v. Ivy, 386 N.E.2d 323, 326 (Ill. 1979)).
193. 422 N.E.2d 605 (Ill. 1981).
194. Id. at 608-09.
195. The Illinois Supreme Court identifies these two cases as "cause No.
53585, In re P.W." and "cause No. 53331, People v. Rhodes." Id.

196. Id.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 609 (discussing "cause No. 53331, People v. Rhodes").
Rhodes, 422 N.E.2d. at 607 (discussing In re P.W.).
Id. at 608.
Id. at 607 (discussing cause No. 53560, People v. Van Zant)..
Id. at 609.
Id. (Simon, J., dissenting). Cf. People v. Reno, 336 N.E.2d 36, 39 (Ill.
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In cases comparable to Donahue, defense counsel may want to
advise the client to opt for a jury trial. Any failure by the police to
test the fingerprint for age or to prove a secure chain of custody for
the object upon which the fingerprint was found represents
avenues for creating a reasonable doubt in the mind of the jury. In
addition, counsel may also want to submit an instruction to the
court which would instruct the jury that to find the defendant
guilty, the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the fingerprints were found in the immediate vicinity of the crime
and were impressed at the time the crime was committed.
V.

WEAK, UNCERTAIN, OR DOUBTFUL IDENTIFICATION

Aside from accomplice cases, the prosecution's failure to prove
that the defendant has been adequately identified as the
perpetrator constitutes the basis for most reasonable doubt
reversals. Courts have recognized that "[o]f all the factors that
account for the conviction of the innocent, the fallibility of eyewitness identification ranks at the top, far above all the others."0 3
The general rule is that a conviction cannot be sustained if the
witness's identification of the defendant is "vague, doubtful and
uncertain"24 and if there is no corroborating evidence connecting
the defendant with the crime.0 5
The often quoted case of Neil v. Biggers2°6 described five
factors to be considered in evaluating the reliability of an
identification: (1) the opportunity the witness had to view the
offender at the time of the crime; (2) the witness' degree of
attention; (3) the accuracy of the witness' prior description of the
offender; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at
the identification confrontation; and (5) the length of time between
the crime and the identification confrontation.2 7 Illinois courts
utilize the same factors when determining whether the identity of
the accused has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.00

App. Ct. 1975) (finding that chain of custody evidence showed that defendant's
fingerprint could only have been placed on the cigarette package taken from

the victim during the two and a half hour period in which the murder
occurred).
203. People v. Gardner, 221 N.E.2d 232, 236 (Ill. 1966) (citing Fred Inbau,

Book Review, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY. & P.S. 376 ).
204. People v. Cullotta, 207 N.E.2d 444, 446 (Ill. 1965).

205. See People v. White, 372 N.E.2d 691, 692 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (holding
that an uncorroborated identification fails to adequately connect the defendant
to the crime).
206. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).

207. Id. at 199-200.
208. See, e.g., People v. Rodriguez, 728 N.E.2d 695, 707 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000)
(applying Biggers factors and finding that identification was insufficient to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt because of contradiction by independent
witness).
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Moreover, Illinois courts instruct juries that they may consider
these factors during deliberation. °9 Finally, the courts recognize
that other factors, such as the difficulty of making cross-racial
identifications, may also be important to the jury's determination
of positive identification.21 °
A. Opportunity to View
Courts frequently find that a witness did not have an
adequate opportunity to view the perpetrator of a crime under a
number of circumstances: (1) where the witness had little or no
time to view the perpetrator or the perpetrator's face,"' (2) where
the lighting or other conditions for viewing were poor,212 or (3)
209. Ill. Pattern Jury Instr. (Crim.) 315 (West 2000) (Circumstances of
Identification).
210. See People v. Tisdel, 739 N.E.2d 31, 43 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (noting
relevancy of expert witnesses' proposed testimony on identification, which
included information about the unreliability of cross-racial identification).
211. See Cullotta, 207 N.E.2d at 446 (finding that officers had only a
"fleeting view" of the profiles of the perpetrators as the officers drove by in
their patrol cars); People v. McGee, 173 N.E.2d 434, 436 (Ill. 1961) (finding
that no witness of the crime had more than a 'fleeting view" of the
perpetrator, and one witness only saw the perpetrator in profile for a 'couple
of seconds"); People v. Betts, 243 N.E.2d 282, 283 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (noting
that the witness saw the driver of the speeding car for a total of fifteen to
twenty seconds divided into three intervals); People v. Ephraim, 273 N.E.2d
225, 231 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971) (finding that the witness had a limited view of the
perpetrator seen in rear seat of speeding car); People v. Hughes, 376 N.E.2d
372, 373 (1978) (finding that the witness did not have an adequate opportunity
to view the assailants because it was for an unspecified period of time ten
minutes prior to the robbery and because the witness could not see their faces
during the robbery); People v. Laurenson, 268 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ill. App. Ct.
1971) (noting that the witness had 'but a fleeting glance" at the robber);
People v. McKibben, 321 N.E.2d 362, 365 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974) (noting that the
witness only had "some seconds" to view assailant); People v. Reed, 243 N.E.2d
628, 629 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (holding that the lack of evidence as to how long
the complainant viewed the perpetrator of the armed robbery amounted to an
inadequate opportunity to view); People v. Reese, 303 N.E.2d 814, 817 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1973) (holding that because the witness saw the assailant's face for
only a "few seconds" as he walked two to three feet, there was an inadequate
opportunity to view); People v. Thompson, 257 N.E.2d 197, 198 (Ill. App. Ct.
1970) (finding that the witness saw the perpetrator 'for about ten seconds").
212. See Betts, 243 N.E.2d at 284 (stating that the witness's view of the
offender through the windshields of two cars on a sunny day was inadequate);
People v. Broome, 264 N.E.2d 772, 774 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970) (finding witness
who viewed the offender at night, in the pouring rain, to have an inadequate
opportunity to view); Cullotta, 207 N.E.2d at 445-46 (finding that witness'
view of defendant was inadequate when made from passing patrol cars
between 2:30 and 4:30 a.m. while it was snowing); Ephraim, 273 N.E.2d at
226, 227, 231 (maintaining that the witnesses claimed to have seen defendant,
through two windshields, in back seat of moving car at about 10:00 or 10:30
p.m. on a September night); Hughes, 308 N.E.2d at 141 (noting that the
witness admitted that the lighting at the street corner where he saw the
perpetrator was 'not good"); Hughes, 376 N.E.2d at 373 (finding inadequate
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where the witness's eyesight was impaired. 13
Careful scrutiny of the witness's opportunity to view the
perpetrator is the most obvious way to establish reasonable doubt
at the trial level. For this reason, well-prepared defense counsel
will want to bring in evidence to persuade the trier of fact that
there was inadequate opportunity to view. Scene photographs,
measurements of distance, maps, and proof of weather conditions
and time of day are all important in establishing that the witness
may not have possessed an adequate opportunity to view the
perpetrator.
B.

Witness's Degree of Attention

The witness's degree of attention to the perpetrator's face or
features is an extremely ambiguous factor. Some courts have held
that when the witness views the offender shortly before the
offense-rather than during it-and has no particular reason to
note the offender's features, the witness's lack of close attention
will diminish the reliability of the identification.214 Similarly,
scientific studies of identification tend to show that identifications
made under stressful or difficult circumstances, such as those
present in most violent crimes, are less-not more-reliable than
those made by witnesses who have no particular reason to
memorize a person's features.21 '
At the trial level, cross-

opportunity to view when witness saw robbers through store window at 8:00
p.m. on a February evening); Laurenson, 268 N.E.2d at 184-85 (stating that
the witness saw the driver of the car used in robbery at 11:00 p.m.); McGee,
173 N.E.2d at 435 (stating that kitchen window where offender was seen at
2:45 a.m. was illuminated only by a "night light" of unknown wattage);
McKibben, 321 N.E.2d at 365 (finding that the vestibule of the building was
illuminated only by 50 or 60 watt bulb, but the basement, where crime
occurred, and the stairs to basement were unlighted); Reed, 243 N.E.2d at 629
(stating that the witness viewed the offender at 8:45 p.m. in January); Reese,
303 N.E.2d at 817-18 (stating that the witness saw the attacker's face in the
vestibule where no electric lights were on and which was illuminated only by
daylight streaming through glass-paneled door).
213. See Broome, 264 N.E.2d at 774 (stating that the witness was not
wearing his eyeglasses at the time that he saw the offender); McKibben, 321
N.E.2d at 364 (stating that the witness was blind in one eye).
214. See Reese, 303 N.E.2d at 817 (stating that the witness saw assailant's
face for only a "few seconds" prior to a rape); White, 372 N.E.2d at 692 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1978) (noting that the witness, a hotel clerk, stated that when he first
saw robbers when they entered hotel, "he assumed ... they were looking for
rooms and had no reason to look at them carefully").
215. See, e.g., ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS
TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL (3d ed. 1997); GARY L. WELLS & ELIZABETH
F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 1 (1984);
Elizabeth Loftus & D. Fishman, Expert Psychological Testimony on Eyewitness
Identification, 4 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 87-103 (1978); June E. Chance & Alvin
G. Goldstein, Other-Race Effect and Eyewitness Identification, in
PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 153 (Siegfried L.
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examination designed to show that the witness's attention was
really drawn to something else, such as the weapon drawn or
displayed during a violent crime, is often helpful in diminishing
the importance of the "close attention" factor.
C. Accuracy of the Witness' PriorDescription
In a significant number of cases, appellate courts have
reversed based upon discrepancies between the witness's
description of the offender and the defendant's actual
appearance.2 6 Thus, the witness's failure to notice significant
features of the perpetrator's face, hair, or clothing, have
contributed to appellate reversal.217 When the witness knew the
defendant before the crime, the discrepancy can also support an
argument that the witness is lying.
Moreover, discrepancies between a prior description and the
defendant's appearance will support an argument that the witness
is honestly mistaken as to the perpetrator's identity. However,
where some, but not all, of the details identified by the witness
match the defendant's actual appearance, defense counsel must
make a strategic decision whether to bring out the description at
all. There is a danger that admission of part of a prior description
is likely to lead to admission of the entire description under the
doctrine of completeness.218 Where the majority of the description's

Sporer et al. eds., 1996); Platz & Hosch, Cross-Race/Ethnic Eyewitness
Identification: A Field Study, 18 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 972 (1988);
Lindsey et al., Can People Detect Eyewitness-Identification Accuracy Within
and Across Situations, 66 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 79 (1981); Roy S.
Malpass & Kravitz, Recognition for Faces of Own and Other Race, 13 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 330 (1969).
216. See People v. Barney, 208 N.E.2d 378, 378-79 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965)
(stating that the witness described the offender as 26 years old, five feet, six
inches tall, 170 pounds, with stooped posture, while defendant was actually 35
years old, five feet, eleven inches tall, 210-220 pounds, with erect posture);
People v. Ford, 553 N.E.2d 33, 35 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (noting that the witness
described the perpetrator as 38 years old, five feet, nine inches tall, and
weighing 165 pounds, while defendant was actually 31 years old, five feet,
seven inches tall, and weighed 140 pounds); Reese, 303 N.E.2d at 818 (stating
that the witness described the offender as being 29 years old, five feet, nine
inches tall, and weighing 145 pounds, while defendant was actually 17 years
old, six feet, two inches tall, and weighed 155-65 pounds).
217. See People v. Byas, 453 N.E.2d 1141, 1145 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (stating
that the defendant had a hairless chest and stomach); Ford, 553 N.E.2d at 36

(noting that the defendant had severe scarring on the left side of his face and
body); People v. King, 295 N.E.2d 258, 260 (Ill. App. Ct. 1969) (stating that the
defendant had a heavy mustache); Laurenson, 268 N.E.2d at 184-85 (noting
that defendant had tattoos on his left arm).
218. The doctrine of completeness is defined by BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY as
the "[riule of evidence which permits further use of a document to explain
portion of document already in evidence." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 285 (6th
ed. 1990). See also-People v. Olinger, 493 N.E.2d 579 (1986) (discussing the
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details jibe with the defendant's features, it may be wiser to object
to the admission of any prior description as hearsay, rather to
elicit minor inconsistencies.
D Level of Certainty
The witness's level of certainty at the identification
confrontation is rarely an issue, either at the trial or the appellate
level. At trial, in open court, the witness will usually identify the
defendant quite readily.219 A witness's demeanor during a preaccusation identification procedure, where a suspect has no right
to counsel, is usually witnessed only by police officers, who have
little incentive to record uncertainty or hesitation. However,
appellate courts have reversed based upon uncertainty in only a
limited number of cases.2 °
Although the certainty of witness identification factor of the
Biggers test may be difficult to attack, certain defense tactics may
prove successful. Perhaps the best way to counter in-court
identifications is to emphasize both the contrived and ritualistic
quality of the identification. To weaken a lineup or photo-array
identification, defense counsel may wish to emphasize the lack of
impartial witnesses who can vouch for the identifying witness's
level of certainty at any pretrial identification procedure.
E. Lapse of Time
Although there is no time limit beyond which an
identification will cease to be reliable, a substantial length of time
between the charged occurrence and the witness's identification
diminishes the reliability of the identification. 22 ' Additionally, a
particularly suggestive identification procedure may also support a

doctrine of completeness in Illinois).

219. See Ford, 553 N.E.2d at 35 (noting that witness's certainty of
identification at trial is not conclusive as to the certainty of his initial
description).
220. See Byas, 453 N.E.2d at 1144-45 (stating that the witness was unable to
identify defendant at lineup after twenty minutes of viewing and eventually

said that defendant "looked most similar" to her assailant, and the witness
similarly hesitated at the preliminary hearing); Ford, 553 N.E.2d at 36 (noting
that no evidence was introduced as to officer's level of certainty when viewing

single photograph of defendant); White, 372 N.E.2d at 692 (stating that the
witness identified the defendant on direct examination but admitted on crossexamination that he had 'some doubt" that defendant was one of the
perpetrators, and the witness also failed to pick defendant's picture out of a

photo-array).
221. See Barney, 208 N.E.2d at 379 (noting the six month lapse between the

crime and the witness's identification); Ford, 553 N.E.2d at 36 (noting that one
year had elapsed between the undercover narcotics buy and the defendant's
arrest); Reese, 303 N.E.2d at 818 (stating that there was a two month
separation between the incident and the identification).
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finding of reasonable doubt.222 If an identification procedure can is
particularly suggestive, it is sometimes better not to file a pretrial
motion to suppress the procedure; instead, defense counsel may
want to attack the suggestiveness of the entire procedure, itself,
which can be a powerful source of reasonable doubt.
Defense counsel must take into account the most recent
identification case considered by the Illinois Supreme Court,
People v. Slim.2 2 Although that case affirmed the defendant's
conviction, it contains a number of peculiar facts which limit its
applicability. In Slim, the witness, a victim of an armed robbery,
identified the defendant twice-once at an apparently proper
lineup and once in court.22 ' There was no dispute that the victim
had a good opportunity to view the offender at the time of the
crime.226 The defendant was also driving the victim's car when the
police arrested him eleven days after the crime.226
The defendant in Slim argued that the identification was
fatally weakened by three factors: (1) the victim's failure to notice
several of the defendant's facial features, including the braces on
his teeth and his "unusually" thick lips; (2) a discrepancy between
the victim's initial description of the defendant's height and weight
and the defendant's actual height and weight; and (3) the eleven
days separating the commission of the crime from the lineup
identification of the defendant. 27 The court, however, disagreed.
The victim's failure to notice the braces and thick lips was
unimportant because a "witness is not expected or required to
distinguish individual and separate features of a suspect in
making an identification" but can instead give a "general
description based on the total impression the accused's appearance
made."228 The claimed discrepancy in height and weight might
have been significant-five feet, three inches and 135 pounds in an
initial description to the police, as opposed to an estimate by the

222. People v. Gardner, 221 N.E.2d 232, 233 (Ill. 1966) (stating that the

witness identified the defendant at a one person show-up at the hospital);
People v. Jefferson, 182 N.E.2d 1, 3 (Ill. 1962) (stating that the witness
identified defendant in a two-person showup at the police station); Laurenson,
268 N.E.2d at 184-85 (stating that the witness was shown three photographs,
one of defendant and two of men who had already been identified as
perpetrators, and the witness was also present in the preliminary hearing
courtroom when the defendant was called and he appeared in handcuffs);
McKibben, 321 N.E.2d at 366 (noting that the witness was shown one
photograph of defendant by the police officer who told the witness that officer
was investigating the charged crime).

223. 537 N.E.2d 317 (Ill. 1989).
224. Id. at 318.
225. Id.

226. Id.
227. Id. at 319.
228. Slim, 537 N.E.2d at 320.
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defendant's father of five feet nine inches and 165 pounds.229
However, no actual measurement of the defendant was made, and
another defense witness estimated the defendant's height at five
feet two inches."' ° But the most important fact relied upon by the
court was the corroboration between the identification and the
defendant's presence in the victim's car.2" In cases lacking such
corroboration, Slim is of limited significance.
VI.

STATE'S FAILURE TO CALL WITNESSES OR TO INTRODUCE
EVIDENCE

The failure of the prosecution either to introduce possible
evidence, to perform feasible tests, or to call available witnesses
forms one of the more powerful arguments for acquittal at trial,
particularly in a case argued to a jury. In certain egregious cases,
these gaps in the state's evidence have resulted in reversal on
appeal.
Illinois courts are not entirely clear as to whether, and under
what circumstances, the prosecution's failure to call an available
witness will give rise to an inference that the testimony of the
missing witness would have been damaging to the state's case.
The greater number of cases recognizing this inference involve
confidential informants. For example, in the leading case of People
v. Strong,"' the Illinois Supreme Court held that the state's
unexplained failure to produce a confidential informant to rebut
the defendant's defense of entrapment would "give rise to an
inference against the State," even though the state was not
obligated to call the informant.233 A number of entrapment cases
involving informers have followed the decision in Strong.234 Still,
in a number of entrapment-informer cases, the courts have held
that the defendant was entitled to the adverse inference but that
the state's other evidence sufficiently
proved the defendant's guilt
2 35
beyond a reasonable doubt.

229. Id. at 318.
230. Id.

231. Id. at 322-23.
232. 172 N.E.2d 765 (Ill. 1961).

233. Id. at 768.
234. See People v. Dollen, 290 N.E.2d 879, 882 (Ill. 1972) (holding that the

adverse inference supported a finding that the state had failed to disprove
entrapment where the state claimed that the informer had "disappeared,"
but refused to provide defense with records related to him); People v. Poulos,

554 N.E.2d 448, 454 (Ill. 1990) (holding that the adverse inference supported a
finding that the state had failed to disprove entrapment).

235. See, e.g., People v. Cross, 396 N.E.2d 812, 817 (Ill. 1979) (holding that
the state's evidence was sufficient to find defendant guilty notwithstanding
defendant's entitlement to the adverse inference); People v. Gonzales, 260
N.E.2d 234, 239 (Ill. 1970) (stating the same proposition); People v. Tipton,
401 N.E.2d 528, 533 (Ill. 1980) (stating the same proposition).
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Although one court has asserted that Poulos limited the
holding in Strong to entrapment cases,"' this is not true. The
court, in Poulos, merely stated that the adverse inference is
"particularly significant," where, as in Poulos, "the State fails to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was
predisposed" to commit the charged offense.237 Moreover, in a case
involving a confidential informant in which no entrapment defense
was raised,"8 the court held that the prosecution's failure to
produce the informant, who had allegedly witnessed an
undercover narcotics buy, gave
rise, together with other factors, to
239
a reasonable doubt of guilt.
Indeed, although Illinois courts appear particularly ready to
draw an adverse inference against the prosecution when the
missing state witness is a confidential informant who might, but
does not, rebut an entrapment defense, the adverse inference has
been applied in other instances as well. For example, in People v.
Smith, 40 the court discussed the circumstances under which the
prosecution's failure to call an occurrence witness would support
an adverse inference." 1 In Smith, the prosecution based its case
upon the circumstantial evidence of a single witness who initially
told the police that he knew nothing, but who later said that he
saw the defendants dragging the victim towards the alley where
the victim's lifeless body was eventually found.242 The defense
impeached the witness with evidence of his prior inconsistent
statement and with evidence that he had consumed ten drinks of
alcohol on the night in question.242 He also testified that the
defendants and the victim were followed to the alley by a crowd of
people, numbering approximately eighteen.244 Since the record
showed that the state knew the names and addresses of many of
these other potential witnesses, they were available-yet
missing-state witnesses.4 5
Given the weaknesses in the
testimony of the single occurrence witness, the "totality of the
circumstances"
warranted the invocation of the adverse
inference.2 6 The Smith court distinguished other cases in which
no adverse inference was drawn because, in those other cases, the
testimony of the witness or witnesses actually called was "clear

236. See People v. Ayala, 567 N.E.2d 450, 457 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
237. Poulos, 554 N.E.2d at 453.
238. People v. Johnson, 548 N.E.2d 433 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. at 436.
278 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1971).
Id. at 552-53.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id.

245. Smith, 278 N.E.2d at 553.

246. Id.
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and convincing" and "complete in all respects." 47
Similarly, in People v. DiVito,248 the complaining witness
testified that he had been robbed by two men. 249 Although the
police found the defendant's fingerprint on a metal box, which had
been moved during the robbery, the complaining witness did not
identify the defendant as the robber. 20 The defendant testified
that he had been lured into the apartment by the complaining
witness, who made immoral advances towards him. 51
The
prosecution also did not call a friend of the complaining witness,
who was also present during the robbery. 52 The court held that
the unexplained failure to call the friend gave rise to an adverse
inference.252
Other courts, however, have held that the adverse inference is
limited to circumstances in which the state fails to call a witness
who possesses "unique knowledge of a crucial disputed issue of
fact," or where the state has caused the absence of the witness."'
The prosecution's failure to present physical evidence can also
give rise to a reasonable doubt, particularly where the prosecution
also fails to have such evidence analyzed and preserved. While the
failure to present physical evidence is a point more often urged to
a jury than to a judge, even appellate courts have occasionally
relied upon the absence of potential physical evidence to support
outright reversals.2 0
In jury cases of this kind, defense counsel should necessarily
request the court to instruct the jury that the prosecution's failure
to present available evidence will give rise to an inference that the
247. Id. (quoting People v. Graham, 262 N.E.2d 243 (Ill. App. Ct. 1970)).
Accord Johnson, 548 N.E.2d at 436 (noting that the prosecution failed to
explain the absence of eleven of twelve officers who had allegedly witnessed
drug transaction as part of surveillance team); People v. Villalobos, 368 N.E.2d
556, 557 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977) (noting that the prosecution called only one of six
potential occurrence witnesses).
248. People v. DiVito, 214 N.E.2d 320 (Ill. App. Ct. 1966).
249. Id. at 321.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 322.
253. DiVito, 214 N.E.2d at 322.
254. People v. Zenner, 406 N.E.2d 27, 31 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980) (citing People v.
Williams, 240 N.E.2d 580 (Ill. 1968) (state sent informer out of jurisdiction
before trial)).
255. See, e.g., People v. Garrett, 339 N.E.2d 753, 762 (Ill. 1976) (reversing
because prosecution failed to perform nitrate test on the hands of the deceased
which might have shown whether she had committed suicide); People v.
Mitchell, 375 N.E.2d 531, 533 (Ill. App. Ct. 1978) (reversing because police
failed to test, for fingerprints, screwdriver found near the scene of criminal
damage to property alleged to have been committed by the defendant); People
v. Moore, 287 N.E.2d 130, 133 (Ill. App. Ct. 1972) (reversing because items at
scene of rape were dusted for fingerprints but there was no evidence that
defendant's fingerprints had been found).
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missing evidence would not have favored the prosecution's case.
In People v. Danielly,9. 6 the court held that where potential
physical evidence had been lost through the prosecution's
negligence, the jury should have been instructed that they could
draw an inference that the "true fact is against the state's
'
interest."57
However, whether the Illinois Pattern Instruction
Committee will eventually adopt this instruction or will extend it
to missing live witnesses has not yet been resolved. In the
meantime, it is always possible to argue such inferences, relying
particularly upon the circumstantial evidence instruction which
courts commonly give.
VII.

CREDIBILITY OF A SINGLE WITNESS

The Everest of criminal appellate wins is the reversal based
upon an appellate court finding that a witness's testimony is so
incredible that it cannot support a conviction. The general rule is
that the credibility of witnesses is a matter for the trier of fact,
whether judge or jury. The trier of fact may resolve conflicts or
inconsistencies in the evidence," 9 determine the weight to be given
to the testimony of the witnesses, and make reasonable
inferences."' The appellate court will not "retry" the defendant,
substitute its own judgment for that of the fact-finder, or reverse
merely because the evidence is conflicting. 261 However, where
testimony is contrary to the laws of nature or universal human
experience, the reviewing court is not bound to believe it. 265 The

reviewing court is entitled to conclude, in the appropriate case,
that the state's evidence is so improbable, unsatisfactory, or
confusing,
that it raises a reasonable doubt of the defendant's
263
guilt.

Frequently, obvious defects in witness credibility constitute
the basis for many reasonable doubt reversals. Such witness
credibility defects often involve facts such as intoxication at the
time of the event,2

6'

drug addiction,

6

1

a criminal record, 2 6 or prior

256. 653 N.E.2d 866 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
257. Id. at 873 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 59 (1988)).
258. People v. Ellis, 384 N.E.2d 331, 334 (Ill. 1988).
259. People v. Sanchez, 503 N.E.2d 277, 285 (Ill. 1997).
260. People v. Akis, 347 N.E.2d 733, 734 (Ill. 1976).
261. People v. Collins, 478 N.E.2d 267, 277 (Ill. 1985); People v. Novotny,
244 N.E.2d 182, 188 (Ill. 1969).
262. People v. Coulson, 149 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ill. 1958).
263. See Mannen v. Norris, 170 N.E. 273, 274-75 (Ill. 1930).

264. People v. Butler, 190 N.E.2d 800, 802 (Ill. 1963) (finding that each of
two witnesses had ten to fifteen shots of whiskey or vodka at the time of
occurrence); Coulson, 149 N.E.2d at 97 (noting that the witness had a couple of
beers and two shots on the night in question); People v. Pellegrino, 196 N.E.2d
670, 671 (Ill. 1964) (noting that the witness was in the fourth week of a seven

week period of drunkenness); People v. Villalobos, 368 N.E.2d 556, 559 (Ill.
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6

inconsistent statements. 1
More subtle arguments for reasonable doubt on appeal have
turned on the appellate court's perception that the defendant's
alleged actions were so stupid or unreasonable as to raise a strong
doubt. For example, in People v. Coulson,68 the court found
unbelievable the witness's testimony that five robbers voluntarily
accompanied him to his home on the vague promise of more
money, and then permitted him to go inside alone, trusting that he
would keep his promise not to call the police. 69 Incredible or
unbelievable activity by witnesses has also led to reversal. 7 °
Even though the law provides that the testimony of a police
officer should not be afforded more or less credibility than that of
another witness, appellate reversals based upon a finding of police
incredibility are exceedingly rare. They are not, however, nonexistent. In People v. Warren, 7' for example, a police officer
testified that he stopped a car for a minor traffic violation.272 After
the stop, he saw the defendant sitting on the passenger side in the
rear of the car with a bag of crushed green plant matter open
between his feet. 73 The police then found a second bag of cannabis
under the front seat.274 The defendant testified that one bag was
recovered after police removed the back seat, and that he saw no
second bag. 7' The appellate court reversed outright, relying
partially upon the trial judge's own expressed skepticism that
anyone would be so stupid as to leave a bag of marijuana lying
276
open in plain view.
App. Ct. 1977) (finding that the witness was a "heavy drinker" who had
consumed six to eight beers and several shots of whiskey at the time of the
occurrence, and he may not have been sober at time he testified).
265. McKibben, 321 N.E.2d at 364 (noting that both prosecution witnesses
were drug addicts).
266. Villalobos, 368 N.E.2d at 559 (noting that the witness had record for
burglary, conspiracy, and arson).
267. Coulson, 149 N.E.2d at 99 (stating that the presence of the other two
men was not mentioned until police searched defendant's car and failed to find
money or a gun); Pellegrino, 196 N.E.2d at 672 (stating that the witness had
previously accused two other persons of having perpetrated charged crime);
Villalobos, 368 N.E.2d at 558-60 (maintaining that the witness testified at
trial that he saw only a "shining object" in defendant's hands, whereas at
preliminary hearing he said he saw a knife with a five to six inch blade).
268. 149 N.E.2d 96 (Ill. 1958).
269. Id. at 99.
270. See, e.g., Butler, 190 N.E.2d at 800-01 (stating that the witnesses
claimed that they entered apartment of two transvestites because they were
"afraid").
271. 353 N.E.2d 250 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
272. Id. at 251.
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Warren, 353 N.E.2d at 252.
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Similarly, in People v. Quintana,"' a police officer testified
that from a distance of twenty feet, at night, he could see the
defendant throw two packages, each one of which was two by three
inches in size.21 8 He testified that he could tell that the packages
were of the type customarily used by sellers of marijuana."9 The
defendant testified that the officer first stopped a group of five or
six other men, and the officer then appeared to look around the
area of the earlier stop with a flashlight.8 ° The appellate court,
reversing outright, relied upon three facts: (1) the testimony of the
chemist that the packages were not of the type customarily used to
package marijuana; (2) the trial judge's skepticism about the
officer's testimony at an earlier motion; and (3) evidence from both
sides that the officer had repeatedly arrested the defendant in the
past-each time without probable cause and each time for the
expressed purpose of inducing the defendant to become the
officer's informer.28'

VIII. CONFLICTING TESTIMONY BY MULTIPLE WITNESSES
Historically, Illinois courts have also reversed, although less
frequently, based upon serious conflicts in the testimony of
multiple witnesses. In the leading Illinois Supreme Court case of
People v. Jefferson,8 2 for example, the victim of an armed robbery
testified that he was unable to identify the defendant as one of the
robbers. 82 Two other prosecution witnesses, each of whom had a
poorer opportunity to view the robber, contradicted the victim and
identified the defendant."'
Their testimony, however, was
weakened by a suggestive identification procedure. 8'
The
defendant presented uncontradicted alibi evidence, as well as
testimony by a second witness that the first witness had
committed the robbery together with two other men, neither of
whom was the defendant. ' The Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that the contradiction between the victim's failure positively to
identify the defendant and the suspect identifications of the two
other prosecution witnesses were sufficient to justify outright
reversal. 8 '
Following Jefferson, the appellate court reversed a number of

277.
278.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

234 N.E.2d 406 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
Id. at 407-08.
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id. at 408-09.
182 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1962).
Id. at 1-2.

284. Id. at 2.
285. Id. at 3.

286. Id.
287. Jefferson, 182 N.E.2d at 3.
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convictions based upon discrepancies between the testimony of
multiple witnesses, even when the contradictions involved less
critical issues of fact. For example, in People v. Hughes,28 two
witnesses identified the defendant as the murderer.8 9 One of the
two identifying witnesses, however, denied that the second witness
This contradiction, when
was present during the murder.2 9
combined with several other weaknesses in the testimony of each
of the two identifying witnesses, established a reasonable doubt
upon which the appellate court reversed. 9' Similarly, in People v.
Broome,2 92 the state's witnesses contradicted each other as to the
time when a burglary had taken place.292 The court concluded that
this contradiction, combined with internal weaknesses in the
testimony of each witness, was "substantial" and "significant,"
enough to create a reasonable doubt.294 Similar contradictions
have been significant in cases where other factors also fatally
weakened the prosecution's case.29 9

Several years prior to the adoption of the Collins-Young "light
most favorable" language, however, the Illinois Supreme Court
considerably weakened the power of this method of establishing
reasonable doubt on appeal. In People v. Yarbrough,"' a witness,
who claimed that he was able to view his assailant for twenty-five
or thirty seconds, identified the defendant.297 A second prosecution
witness testified that the first witness remained on the floor
throughout the robbery and therefore lacked any opportunity to
view the defendant.299 The Illinois Supreme Court concluded
simply that the jury "obviously preferred" the testimony of one
witness, whose testimony, judged by itself, could be found
credible. 99
Following Yarbrough, matters remained unchanged until the
recent Illinois Supreme Court reversal in the death penalty case
of People v. Smith."° The defendant was originally convicted of the
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

App. Ct. 1974).
308 N.E.2d 137 (Ill.
Id. at 141.
Id. at 140.
Id. at 141-42.
App. Ct. 1970).
264 N.E.2d 772 (Ill.
Id. at 773.

294. Id.
295. See Butler, 190 N.E.2d at 801 (stating that the prosecution witnesses
contradicted each other as to the location of the jacket from which money was
stolen and whether the victim left the room where the theft occurred);
McKibben, 321 N.E.2d at 364 (stating that one prosecution witness testified
that she and another prosecution witness had taken heroin the night of the
murder, a fact which the other witness denied).
1977).
296. 367 N.E.2d 666 (Ill.
297. Id. at 667.
298. Id. at 668.
299. Id.
1999).
300. 708 N.E.2d 365 (Ill.

The John MarshallLaw Review

[34:495

murder of a prison warden, Virdeen Willis, Jr., who was shot while

leaving a bar."°1 In the Illinois Supreme Court's initial review of
the case, it found the evidence to be close, but also sufficient to
convict, and it reversed on the grounds of trial error.0 2 At the
retrial, as at the first trial, the defendant's conviction rested upon
the testimony of a single eyewitness, Debrah Carraway. Debrah
Carraway did not tell anyone that she was an eyewitness until two
days after the murder, when she went to the police station to see
her sister, Ronda, who the police were questioning.3
In both
trials the defense established that Debrah Carraway had a motive
to falsely implicate the
defendant because the police also suspected
3 4
her sister's boyfriend.
At the second trial, however, other witnesses also
contradicted Debrah Carraway's testimony as to some of the key
facts of the event."' The "most glaring" deficiency in her testimony
involved the number of people present when Willis was shot.3 6
Three witnesses, the bartender and Willis's two companions, all
testified that Willis had left the bar with the companions and was
shot just after leaving.3 7 Willis, however, testified that he had left
the bar alone, followed by the defendant, and was alone when
shot.3 00
Moreover, the bartender's testimony contradicted
3 0
Carroway's testimony that the defendant followed Willis out.
The bartender testified that he saw the defendant leave the bar
several minutes before Willis.3"0 The state's argument at trial that
the defendant could have waited in the vestibule was not a
reasonable inference, as there was no evidence that Willis's two
companions had passed someone in the vestibule or that the
vestibule was an area in which someone could hide.3" ' The
defendant was also "repeatedly impeached" with a signed
statement she had given to a defense investigator, admitting,
contrary to her testimony at trial, that she had used drugs
everyday during the time of the murder, had been looking for
drugs on that day, and had seen one of the other possible
witnesses to the crime being beaten by the police. 312
In a striking decision, the Illinois Supreme Court held that,
even judged in the light most favorable to the state, the evidence
301. Id. at 366-67.

302. People v. Smith, 565 N.E.2d 900, 905, 917 (Ill. 1990).
303. Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 371.
304. Id..
305. Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 370.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Smith, 708 N.E.2d at 370.

311. Id.
312. Id. at 370-71.
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was not sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.313 In a passage resonating to the current mood
of dismay at the prospect that innocent men might be put to death,
the court said:
What is involved here is the standard of proof which is applicable to
all crimes. That is to say, conviction beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whether the crime charged be trespass, shoplifting, armed robbery,
or murder, the test is the same. The burden of meeting this
standard falls solely on the prosecution. If it fails to meet this
burden, a defendant is entitled to a finding of not guilty. No
defendant is required to prove his innocence.
While a not guilty finding is sometimes equated with a finding of
innocence, that conclusion is erroneous. Courts do not find people
guilty or innocent. They find them guilty or not guilty. A not guilty
verdict expresses no view as to a defendant's innocence. Rather, it
indicates simply that the prosecution has failed to meet its burden
of proof. While there are those who may criticize courts for turning
criminals loose, courts have a duty to ensure that all citizens receive
those rights which are applicable equally to every citizen who may
find himself charged with a crime, whatever the crime and whatever
the circumstances. When the State cannot meet its burden of proof,
the defendant must go free. This case happens to be a murder case
carrying a sentence of death against a defendant where the State
has failed to meet its burden. It is no help to speculate that the
defendant may have killed the victim. No citizen would be safe from
prosecution under such a standard.314
Although Smith paid lip service to the "light most favorable"
standard, the case clearly represents a return to a more nuanced
and stringent approach to the review of criminal convictions.
After all, in the "light most favorable" to the prosecution, the
defendant had hid in the vestibule.
The witnesses who
contradicted
Debrah Carraway were
mistaken, and the
deficiencies in Carraway's testimony were all available to the
triers of fact, who judged her credibility and did not, evidently,
find it wanting. Smith represents a clear signal to the appellate
courts that they can and should return to the traditional standard
of review.
CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates that Illinois appellate courts can
perform a key role in protecting the innocent from wrongful
convictions. Any appellate court worth its salt will always defer to
the trier of fact in circumstances in which a case depends, in
critical measure, on demeanor evidence not available in a cold

313. Id. at 366, 369.
314. Id. at 371.
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record.
However, appellate courts can maintain the Illinois
tradition of developing rules and precedents applicable to different
types of evidence and then examining challenged convictions in
light of those rules and precedents, without giving up deference to
the findings of the trial courts. Vigilant juries and judges are the
first line of defense against wrongful conviction; skeptical and
intelligent appellate courts are the second. It is high time that
courts in Illinois returned to these principles.

